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Damien Demailly and Philippe Quirion1 
Leakage from climate policies and border tax adjustment: 
lessons from a geographic model of the cement industry 
Abstract 
We present a spatial international trade model, GEO, which computes transportation costs by 
not treating markets as dimensionless points and explicitly represents capacity shortages and 
investment decisions in new production capacities. We link it to CEMSIM, a partial 
equilibrium model of the world cement industry developed by the IPTS. We assume that the 
Kyoto Protocol Annex B countries (except the USA and Australia), create a CO2 tax at 15 
euros per tonne. This policy entails significant emissions reductions (around 20%) in these 
countries. A significant leakage occurs, with an emissions increase in the rest of the world of 
around 20% of the emissions reduction in Annex B-USA&Australia. We thus run two 
scenarios combining a CO2 tax with border-tax adjustments (BTA). With the more ambitious 
BTA tested, not only is there no leakage, but emissions in the rest of the world decrease 
slightly. However, compared to business-as-usual, non-Annex B price-competitiveness and 
production decrease a little and these countries loose some market shares, so they could 
attack this system as distorting competition in favour of Annex B countries. A less ambitious 
BTA is thus tested, which cannot be criticised on this ground and prevents almost all leakage. 
The only drawback of both BTA policies is that the cement price in Annex BUSA& 
Australia increases a little more than without BTA, further impacting the cement 
consumers in these countries. 
Keywords 
Cement, leakage, spillover, climate change mitigation, Kyoto Protocol, border-tax adjustment, 
international trade, transportation cost 
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Introduction2 
A recurrent concern raised by industry against climate policies is the fear of competitive 
distortions, industrial relocations and carbon leakage in case of asymmetric constraint. The 
recent entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol is unlikely to reduce these concerns since the 
developed countries that have ratified it only account for 35% of world energy-related CO2 
emissions (Enerdata, 2005, p. 9). 
Intuition suggests that these sectors may be affected by strong carbon asymmetric 
constraints. But to this intuition can be opposed the fact that the carbon-intensive sectors are 
typically weakly exposed to international competition. International trade of cement for 
example accounts for less than 7% of the world consumption, mostly because of the 
existence of significant transportation costs and of capacity shortages. 
What makes difficult to assess both the magnitude and the determinant of carbon leakage is 
the fact that the current representation of international trade is dominated by the well-known 
Armington specification, or similar functional forms. This specification assumes that 
products are differentiated by their place of production. For example the chemicals produced 
by different countries are not perfect substitutes. In applied models, this tool is used in such a 
way that it merges all the grounds for imperfect substitution – heterogeneity of the products 
throughout the world, national preferences, transportation costs – in the Armington 
substitution elasticity, or a parameter with an equivalent meaning, which is either 
econometrically calibrated, what is difficult3, or just guesstimated. 
Our intuition is that, even though the use of the Armington specification is probably the best 
compromise for most sectors, especially aggregated ones, progress can be made through an 
alternative approach for the sectors dealing whit relatively homogeneous products whose 
trade is not much affected by national preferences, and where transportation costs and 
capacity constraints are central to explain international trade patterns. Many GHG-intensive 
sectors fit with these characteristics. 
Such an alternative must have three objectives. First, it has to represent satisfactorily 
transportation costs, notably by not treating markets as dimensionless points. Second, it must 
take explicitly into account capacity shortages. Third, investment decisions in new 
production capacities have to be modelled realistically. 
We developed a spatial international trade model, GEO, that: 
• drops the imperfect substitution assumption among goods produced in different places; 
2 The present analysis has benefited from a deep collaboration with the Institute for Prospective Technological 
Studies (IPTS – Joint Research Centre – European Commission). Our analysis is partly based on the world 
cement model CEMSIM developed by L. Szabo, I. Hidalgo, J. C. Ciscar, A. Soria and P. Russ, from the IPTS. 
We thank them and the IPTS for the explanations on the model, for the free access to a world cement industry 
database compatible with the model structure and for having hosted one of us at the IPTS for two months. We 
also thank F. Le Gallo (INSEE) for providing data on international cement trade and J.C. Hourcade and F. 
Gusforf as well as the participants at the CIRED seminar for useful comments. 
3 Standard methods are likely to underestimate this coefficient (Erkel and Mirza, 2002). For example, if an 
exporting country increases the quality of its products vis-à-vis its competitors (in other words if its non-price 
competitiveness is improved), it will typically increase both its export level and its price. If econometric 
estimations are not able to control this quality effect, they will wrongly find a positive correlation between the 
export price and quantity exported (or at least the observed correlation will be "less negative" than if quality was 
taken into account). As a consequence, export elasticities (i.e., the decrease in exports following an increase in 
export price) will be underestimated, and Armington elasticities as well. However alternative econometric 
methods do not lead to robust results (Erkel and Mirza, 2002). 
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• makes explicit the transportation costs, for both road and sea transportation, utilising a 
spatial representation of the world including 15 500 consuming “areas”, 
• represents the competition among producers in every consumption area, taking into 
account their differentiated marginal production costs, transportation costs and capacity 
shortages by assuming that producers subjected to such a constraint deliver their 
production in the most profitable areas 
• justifies investment decisions by explicitly representing the producers expectation of 
which amount of product can be sold and where. 
We applied this model to cement for three reasons. First, the characteristics of the cement 
sector particularly suit to the use of GEO. Second, this sector is an important greenhouse gas 
emitter: it accounts for around 5% of global anthropogenic CO2 emissions (IEA, 1999). 
Third, it is potentially one of the most impacted by a climate policy: among twelve UE 15 
industry sectors, non-metallic minerals – mostly cement – have the second direct CO2 
emission/turnover ratio (Quirion and Hourcade, 2004)4. Cement manufacturers thus claim 
that an ambitious climate policy would impose an additional burden that may jeopardise their 
competitiveness and induce carbon leakage (e.g., British Cement Association, 2004). 
To represent the cement industry, we use a modified version of CEMSIM, a recursive 
bottom-up model built by the IPTS team (see Szabo et al., 2003 and 2006). GEO and 
CEMSIM are integrated, allowing us to build a business-as-usual scenario until 2030 and 
three climate policy scenarios. 
A CO2 tax at 15 euros per tonne, which is equivalent to auctioned emission allowances with 
the same price, in the Kyoto Protocol Annex B countries that have ratified it (thereafter 
referred to as “the Annex B-R”) turns out to entail significant emissions reductions in these 
countries. However, an important carbon leakage occurs. 
The same policy with border-tax adjustments (BTA), i.e., a rebate on cement exports and a 
taxation of imported cement in Annex B-R, is simulated. Two BTAs are tested. In the first 
one, exported production is completely exempted from the climate policy and imports of 
cement from the rest of the world are taxed in accordance with the CO2 intensity of the 
cement production in the exporting country. In the second BTA scenario, exports benefit 
from a rebate corresponding only to the least CO2-intensive technology available at a large 
scale, and imports are taxed to the same level. Such a system is proposed by Ismer and 
Neuhoff (2004) who argue that it is compatible with the WTO rules, contrary to the first one 
we test. In the two BTA scenarios, the carbon leakage decreases. It is even replaced by a 
slight spillover in the first one. However, in both cases, the cement price in Annex B-R 
increases more than without BTA, further impacting the cement consumers in these 
countries. 
The article is organised as follows: we first describe the GEO-CEMSIM model (section 1), 
then the business-as-usual simulation (2), the policy simulations without (3) and with (4) the 
border-tax adjustment, and section 5 concludes. 
4 Only electricity generation has a higher ratio, but this sector is largely sheltered from international competition 
by transmission losses. 
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1. The GEO-CEMSIM model 
1.1 GEO 
In GEO, the world is modelled as an ensemble of cement consumption “areas” on the one 
hand and producing countries on the other hand5. An area is characterized by its geographical 
position on the globe. The areas used are the 1°x 1° squares defined in the EDGAR database 
(RIVM, 2001), but we subdivided squares with a high population and dropped squares where 
the population is negligible (figure 1). Because of the computation constraints, we assume that 
the totality of the market of a given area is taken by the producers of only one country which, 
given that we have 15.500 areas, is an acceptable approximation, at least in a first step. 
Figure 1: Areas of GEO 
A producing country is first characterized by its variable production cost, its production 
capacity and the intensity of the competition among its domestic producers. We assume that a 
Cournot oligopoly competition takes place among producers of the same country, since it is 
well known that the cement market is far from pure competition (Johnson and Parkman, 
1983). A country is also characterized by its harbours able to trade cement. There are 1.600 
such sea harbours in the world, according to the Lloyd's list (2004). 7.500 border posts, that 
we label “land harbours”, are defined every 25 km on land borders, in order to allow us for 
modelling land trade. 
GEO then calculates the minimum transportation cost from every producing country to every 
area, using road national transportation costs and international sea transportation costs. A 
fixed and a variable transportation cost are distinguished for each transportation mode. 
We assume that a producing country is ready to sell its production in an area at any price 
bigger than the sum of its variable cost and the transportation cost to this area, subject to a 
capacity constraint. When the latter is binding, a producing country sells its production in the 
most profitable areas. Of course, the set of "most profitable areas" depends on other 
producing countries' behaviour, hence the need for an adequate algorithm to determine 
simultaneously what supplier takes each area. The cement price a firm applies in an area is 
limited by a double competition pressure: 
• international competition from the other producing countries (Bertrand competition), and; 
5 Areas, grouped together, form consuming countries. In GEO we have the same 47 consuming and producing 
countries. 
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• national competition pressure from firms of the same producing country (Cournot 
competition). The number of firms in the Cournot model is calibrated to match the 
price/cost margin in the calibration year (1997), and assumed identical thereafter. 
In every area, the cement supplier thus applies a profit margin6 which is the minimum 
between the profit margin defined by the international competition and the profit margin 
defined by the national oligopolistic competition. Using the variable cost and capacity 
constraint of every country as well as the minimum transportation cost between every 
producing country and every consuming area, GEO gives for every area the cement price and 
where it comes from. At the country level, it gives the production and the average cement 
price (which is the weighted sum of the prices in the areas of this country). 
Every country has a capacity constraint, which is not fixed but may be relaxed every year by 
investing in new capacities. In GEO, a country builds new capacities for the market of a given 
area if it expects not only to sell its new production there but also to cover its fixed 
construction cost, despite the competition of the existing and future capacities of the others. 
In order not to mislead the reader of our quantitative results, it is useful to place here two 
caveats. First, we model no inertia in trade, whereas in the real world, for a cement 
manufacturer, exporting in a new market takes some time, notably to develop a distribution 
network. Second, the assumption of Bertrand competition among producers of different 
countries seems too harsh since there is some oligopolistic behaviour among them. However, 
it is the best compromise we found to date between modelling constraints and realism. As a 
consequence, real-world changes are likely to be smoother and less intense than modelled. 
1.2. CEMSIM 
An inverted U-shape curve of “intensity of use” relates the evolution of cement consumption to 
the per capita GDP. As in the original CEMSIM IPTS model, the demand curve for cement is 
assumed isoelastic, with a price-elasticity of 0.2, a value close to that estimated by La Cour and 
Mollgaard (2002, cited and used by IEA, 2004). 
CEMSIM pays particular attention to fuel and technology dynamics. Seven technologies are 
included, characterized by energy, material and labour consumptions, an investment cost and 
a set of retrofitting options. We modified the original CEMSIM model to introduce more 
flexibility in the content of clinker, the carbon intensive intermediary product, in cement and 
in the choice of non primary fuels, following discussions with French cement industrials. 
We stress that the quantification of some technical flexibility (clinker ratio, retrofitting, and 
fuel choice) is very difficult, so our quantitative results should be taken with some care. 
The main exogenous variables of CEMSIM are GDP, population, electricity and primary fuel 
prices, all taken from the POLES model developed by LEPII-EPE. Primary fuel prices are 
higher under business-as-usual than under mitigation policies, since in POLES these policies 
reduce fuel demand, thus world fuel prices. Prices of other fuels (waste and wood fuels, 
petroleum coke) are calibrated. 
We use 1998 and 1997 data on consumption, production capacity, energy demand 
(CEMBUREAU, 1999, 2002) and cement bilateral trade (OECD series C) to calibrate the 
GEO-CEMSIM model, which is then recursively run with a yearly step. 
6 We define profit margin as the ratio (cement price – variable production cost – transportation cost) / (variable 
production cost + transportation cost). 
6 
2. World cement industry in the “business-as-usual” scenario 
The business-as-usual scenario (BaU) is a necessary preliminary step to assess the impacts of 
a carbon mitigation policy. Moreover it provides interesting insights. 
To present the results, we aggregate the 47 producing regions of our model to form 12 
regions: 
1. Europe : EU25, Bulgaria, Romania and the rest of western Europe, 
2. R&U: Russia and the Ukraine, 
3. Japan, 
4. Canada, 
5. The USA, 
6. RJAN: Rest of Japan, Australia and New Zealand (Mostly Australia and New-Zealand), 
7. TRR: Turkey, Rest of the CIS and Rest of Central and Eastern Europe, 
8. LAM: Latin America, 
9. India, 
10. China, 
11. RoA: Rest of Asia, 
12. A&ME: Africa and Middle-East. 
The first four regions have ratified the Kyoto Protocol and will implement climate policies in 
the next sections7. We label them the Annex B-R countries. 
2.1. Increasing share of the developing countries in the world growing consumption 
At the world level, cement consumption is estimated to increase from 1630 Mt in 2000 to 
2900 Mt in 2030, corresponding to an annual 2% growth rate. 
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Figure 2: Consumption in BaU 
At the regional level, the evolution of cement consumption is highly dependent on the 
inverted U-shape hypothesis for the consumption path. The model predicts a high growth in 
developing regions. China and R&U peak around 2020 whereas the consumption in India, 
TRR, A&ME, LAM and RoA is still growing in 2030. On the contrary, no developed region 
7 Unfortunately, since New Zealand is merged with Australia in our set of 47 producing countries, we have to 
assume that it does not implement the Kyoto Protocol although it has ratified this agreement. 
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sees its consumption growing after 2020. Whereas these regions represented 24% of the world 
consumption in 2000, they are projected to represent only 13% in 2030. 
2.2. Importance of the “domestic excess capacities” and decrease in the cement trade 
flows 
A feature of cement international trade is that, according to our model and as in the real world 
until now according to industry experts, very few capacities are built in order to export. 
Almost all the cement traded come from “domestic excess capacities”. The domestic excess 
capacities are the capacities built for the domestic market but that are not fully used for it. For 
example such capacities exist in countries with growing demand because its producers 
anticipate this growth by over-sizing their new plants. The higher is the growth of the 
consumption in a country, the higher is the amount of domestic excess capacities of its 
producers. 
Whereas very few export capacities are built, some countries see their exports limited by their 
capacity. Had they bigger domestic excess capacities, they would export more. Why don’t 
they build export capacities? Because the expected gains of such capacities would not be 
sufficient to cover their investment cost. 
According to our model, another feature of international trade is that its intensity drops 
between 2002 and 2004 from 7 to 4% of the world production, because of the exogenous 
increase in sea transportation costs between these two time periods. This increase, observed in 
reality, is due to the scarcity of transport capacities which originates in their intensive use to 
supply Chinese economical growth. Despite the stabilisation of the sea transportation costs 
after 2004, the intensity of international trade keeps on decreasing until 2030 in our model. 
This is mostly due to the fact that, after 2010, the growth of the consumption slows down in 
many countries. Therefore, their amounts of domestic excess capacities drop, and so does 
their ability to export. 
In a few cases, cement trade is due to a lack of production capacities in the importing country 
(e.g., the Netherlands around 2000). But it is generally driven by differences in production 
costs and, as we have just seen, may be limited by capacity shortages. 
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Figure 3: Exports and Imports in BaU 
Concerning the Annex B-R countries, we observe that European imports drop after the 
increase in sea transportation costs and come mostly from TRR, A&ME and LAM. Such a 
drop occurs in Canada which only keeps on importing cement from the USA. R&U imports 
some cement during all the simulation, from Europe, TRR, RoA and China, whereas Japan 
does not. 
After the increase in sea transportation costs, exports of European, Japanese and R&U 
producers drop. Then, European exports focus on the nearest countries. Utilising mostly the 
road to export cement to the USA, its main client, Canadian exports are not so much impacted 
by this increase. 
For most of the countries, cement trade is marginal, the ratio (Export-Import)/Production 
being very rarely higher than 10% in absolute value. Therefore, in general, the national 
production almost equals the national consumption. 
2.3. “CO2 emission / production” relative decoupling 
CO2 emissions are projected to grow by 55% from 1320 MtCO2 in 2000 to 2035 in 2030 
corresponding to a 1.5% average annual growth rate. The relative decoupling with the 
consumption, which grows in average by 2% per year, is mostly due to the decrease in the 
fuel consumption per ton of cement, thanks to the use of more efficient machines. 
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Figure 6: Carbon emissions in BaU 
Unsurprisingly, the spatial distribution of emissions is roughly correlated with the increase in 
production. Share of China in world emissions decreases through time but it remains the 
largest CO2 emitter with more than 30% of the world emissions in 2030. The share of 
developed countries drops from 22% to 12% of world emissions in 2030. 
3. “Climate policy without border-tax adjustment” scenario ("No BTA") 
3.1. Definition of No BTA 
In this scenario, we assume that Annex B-R countries implement a CO2 tax or a CO2 
Emission Trading Scheme8 with auctioned allowances, without revenue recycling (thereafter: 
"the climate policy"). For 2008-2012, we rely on the estimation of the POLES model, 
assuming that Russia and the Ukraine use their market power to rise the international CO2 
price, up to 15 euros per tonne (Szabo and al., 2003). We assume that this price is sustained 
until the end of the simulation period and that no non-Annex B-R country takes on emission 
targets until 2030. We assume no Clean Development Mechanism. 
This climate policy can not be considered as the most likely outcome of the climate 
negotiations but has the advantage of simplicity as a benchmark for comparative analysis. 
3.2. Technological changes triggered by the carbon value 
The carbon value triggers different mechanisms in CEMSIM-GEO: reduction of cement 
demand due to the increase in production costs and in prices; substitution between clinker and 
added materials in cement composition; substitution between high and low carbon fuels (from 
coal, oil and petroleum coke to gas, waste and wood fuels); retrofitting of carbon intensive 
technologies to low carbon technologies; changes in technological choices for new plants. 
Compared with BaU, variable production costs in Annex B-R countries increase in average by 
10 € per tonne of cement (+30%) from 2008 on. 
8 We stress that in the EU ETS, allowances are not auctioned but given for free, and the quantity distributed is 
influenced by their decisions. In particular, a firm closing an installation will generally stop received allowances 
and conversely, free allowances are distributed for new installations [Schleich and Betz, 2005]. As a 
consequence, the competitiveness impact of the EU ETS and its impact on emissions will be much lower than 
that of the policy we simulate, for a given CO2 price. 
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Regarding the non-Annex B-R countries, they generally benefit from lower production costs 
thanks to the decrease in Annex B-R demand for carbon-intensive fuels, and therefore in 
prices. 
3.3. Significant impacts of the climate policy on trade flows and no building of export 
capacities 
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Figure 7: No BTA: change in Exports compared to BaU 
Consequently, the climate policy has significant impacts on cement trade. Compared with 
BaU, Europe, Canada and Japan stop to export. Inversely R&U, which proves to be less 
impacted than European countries as we will see below, increases its exports to Europe. 
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Compared with BaU, Canada increases its imports from 19 to 26% of its consumption in 
20109, R&U increases from 3 to 10% and Europe from 1 to 4%. Japan, as in BaU, does not 
import cement: the carbon constraint is not strong enough to outweigh its costcompetitiveness 
observed in BaU. 
One interesting point is that only few capacities are built in non-Annex B-R to export in 
Annex B-R, despite the higher production cost of the latter. Exports keep on coming from 
domestic excess capacities, although the exports of some non-Annex B-R countries are not 
9 Figure for 2020 and 2030 are presented in Demailly & Quirion (2005). 
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limited by transport costs but by capacity shortages. This traduces the fact that the rise in 
Annex B-R production costs is not high enough to outweigh not only the transportation costs 
but also the investment costs. 
3.4. Significant drop in the production of Annex B-R 
The growth in variable production costs highly impacts the industry of Annex B-R countries 
for two reasons: fall in domestic consumption (3% in average in 2010, 4% after) and lower 
market shares in the world cement market. Finally, the production of the Annex B-R countries 
drops in average by 7.5% in 2010, 2020 and 2030. 
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Figure 8: No BTA: Production compared to BaU 
3.5. Significant drop in CO2 emissions from Annex B-R and important carbon leakage 
Emissions per tonne of cement in Annex B-R countries decrease with the implementation of 
the climate policy: from -12% in 2010 to -15% in 2030. The magnitude of this drop is roughly 
the same in all Annex B-R countries, R&U excepted which turns out to have more technical 
flexibility. 
Cumulated with the fall in production, this decarbonisation leads to a decrease in carbon 
emissions of Annex B-R ranging from 18% in 2010 up to 22% in 2030. 
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Figure 9: No BTA: CO2 emissions compared to BaU 
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Part of these reductions is compensated by emissions increase in non-Annex B-R countries. 
These countries are less carbon efficient than Annex B-R countries and the gap increases with 
the implementation of the climate policy10. 
The resulting leakage rate (emissions increase in countries outside the Annex B-R divided by 
the emissions decrease in Annex B-R countries) equals 25% in 2010, 13% in 2020 and 16% in 
203011. All in all, world emissions decrease by around 2% in 2010, 2020 and 2030 
4. “Climate policy with border-tax adjustments” scenarios 
4.1 Definition of the two BTA scenarios 
One way of preventing carbon leakage and limiting the effects on competitiveness of a 
fragmented climate regime is to impose border-tax adjustments (BTA): tax exemption of 
GHG-intensive products and materials exported to non-Annex B-R countries; border tax on 
the importation of these products and materials from outside Annex B-R. 
Using analytical models, several authors have demonstrated the rationale for BTA for dealing 
with international pollutions: Markusen (1975), Hoel (1996) and Maestad (1998). In 
particular, Hoel (1996) showed that BTA are a better response to pollution leakage than the 
usually applied differentiation of the tax level between the exposed and the sheltered sector. 
More recently, Mathiesen and Mæstad (2002), with a partial equilibrium world model of the 
steel industry, and Majocchi and Missaglia (2001), with a general equilibrium model, 
quantified the impact of BTA. It turned out that BTA prove to be efficient to prevent adverse 
impact on the domestic industry of a carbon constraint. 
We first assess below this system in the “Complete BTA” scenario, but its compatibility with 
the WTO/GATT is controversial; see Hoerner (1998) for an early discussion and Ismer and 
Neuhoff (2004) for an up-to-date synthesis. The latter two authors conclude that to be 
WTOcompatible, 
the BTA should be set "at the level of additional costs incurred for procurement 
of CO2 emission permits during production of processed materials using the best available 
technology". This is why without pushing this juridical discussion further, we provide an 
application of the BTA proposed by Ismer and Neuhoff in the "WTO BTA" scenario. We take 
as best available technology the dry rotary kiln with pre-heater and pre-calciner fuelled by 
natural gas12. 
In the rest of this section, we address two questions: do the two BTA scenarios effectively 
prevent CO2 leakage, and could non-Annex B-R countries attack these systems on the ground 
that they suffer too much of them? 
10 We notice that Chinese and Indian emissions decrease and that RJAN’s emissions increase, marginally, 
although these countries are not impacted directly by the ETS (they do not increase or decrease their imports or 
their exports compared to BaU). It is due to the fact that their consumption levels are indirectly impacted by the 
changes in the competition pressure they face. 
11 This is not the place to explain in detail the ups and down of the leakage rate. Suffice it to say that part of the 
decarbonisation is due to a more important use of waste recycling or a higher utilisation of efficient technologies; 
after 2020, prices of the waste recycling increase whereas the potentials of efficiency improvements are 
saturated. 
12 An even less CO2 intensive solution is to burn waste and wood fuels instead of gas, but since we assume that 
this solution may not be generalised because of the limited availability of these fuels, we did not retain it as "the 
best available technology". 
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4.2. Differentiated impacts on cost-competitiveness 
Thereafter, we present the results of the two BTA scenarios in comparison with BaU. For 
simplicity sake, we present the results for Annex B-R and non-Annex B-R countries in 
aggregate, and for 2010 only. We insist on the differences of the impacts inside and outside 
Annex B-R markets. 
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Figure 10: Variable production in 2010 on Annex B markets 
Under Complete BTA, Annex B-R variable production cost in Annex B markets increases in 
average by 10.5€ per tonne of cement in 2010. It increases in average by 12.5€ for the non- 
Annex B countries. Thus, competition terms on Annex B markets are modified in favour of 
Annex B countries, which are in general more carbon efficient than the others. Indeed, not 
only do they use more energy efficient technologies and less carbon intensive fuels already in 
BaU, but the climate policy also leads them to reduce their CO2 emissions per tonne of 
cement (especially by decreasing their clinker rates), while non-Annex B countries do not. 
Therefore the Complete BTA system tends to improve the cost-competitiveness of Annex B 
countries in their territory. 
Under WTO BTA, the “after tax production cost” of non-Annex B-R countries in Annex B-R 
markets is the one of the less carbon intensive technology. Their variable production cost 
increases in average by 10€ in 2010. Therefore, the BTA WTO system results into a slight 
degradation of the cost-competitiveness of Annex B-R countries on their territory. 
Non-Annex B markets 
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Figure 11: Variable production cost in 2010 on non-Annex B markets 
On the markets outside Annex B-R, the Complete BTA still impacts variable production costs: 
• Countries implementing the climate policy speed the retrofitting of their plants toward 
efficient technologies. 
• In the other direction, their average fuel costs increase (in general). This is due to the 
higher utilisation of low C fuels that are, most of the time, more expensive. 
Finally, we observe that most of the Annex B-R countries increase their cost-competitiveness 
on the markets outside their territory in 2010 (-0.4€ in average). However these gains only last 
a few years after the implementation of the system. 
Under the WTO BTA, the cost-competitiveness of Annex B-R countries on the non-Annex BR 
markets suffers a bit since the technologies less efficient than the Best Available 
Technology are partially taxed. Their variable production cost increases, in average by 1.5€ in 
2010. 
4.3. Increase in Annex B-R net exports 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
Import Annex B / Export Non 
Annex B 
Export Annex B / Import Non 
Annex B 
Mt of cement 
BaU 
No BTA 
Complete BTA 
WTO BTA 
Figure 12: Imports and Exports in 2010 
Annex B markets 
In the Complete BTA scenario, as we have just seen, most Annex B-R countries increase their 
cost-competitiveness inside their territory. Therefore non-Annex B-R countries loose some 
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market shares, paving the way to a possible qualification of this system as protectionist. 
Annex B-R countries decrease their imports not only because of the increase in their 
competitiveness but also because the cement price increase makes their consumption drop. 
Under the WTO BTA scenario, Annex B-R countries import more cement from non-Annex BR 
countries than in BaU, since their cost-competitiveness is a little bit reduced. This system is 
thus not protectionist vis-à-vis non-Annex B countries. 
Non-Annex B markets 
In the Complete BTA scenario, but also, to a smaller extent, in the WTO BTA scenario, Annex 
B-R countries increase their exports to non-Annex B-R. In the latter case, this is due to the 
increase in capacities available for exports, following the drop in consumption in these 
countries, which more than compensates the small decrease in cost-competitiveness. In the 
Complete BTA case, this is also due to the temporary increase in their cost-competitiveness. 
To sum up on the impact of BTA on trade and competitiveness, the Complete BTA scenario 
could be qualified as protectionist because, although it treats domestic and foreign producers 
in a similar way (they pay the same cost per ton of CO2), it gives a competitive advantage to 
Annex B-R producers, who use cleaner production techniques. On the contrary, in the WTO 
BTA scenario, Annex B-R countries suffer from a slightly higher cost increase than their 
competitors, which causes a small increase in their imports. However, as is apparent from the 
figure above, their exports rise by a larger extent, despite this relative variable cost increase, 
because some of their production capacities become available for exports. Therefore, should 
the WTO BTA policy be considered as distorting competition in favour of Annex B-R 
countries? This seems highly dubious since this increase in net exports originates only in the 
drop in domestic consumption, and would occur also following a macroeconomic recession, 
for example. 
4.4. Higher consumption drop but lower production drop with BTA than without 
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Figure 13: Production in 2010 compared to BaU 
In the two BTA scenarios, domestic prices increase in Annex B-R countries more than 
without BTA: +21% compared with BaU in 2010 without BTA, +27 with Complete BTA and 
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+ 26% with WTO BTA. Consequently, consumption in Annex B drops more significantly: in 
average by 4% in 2010, vs. 3% in the No BTA scenario. 
From the total production point of view, this drop is, in both scenarios, more than halved by 
the gains on the international market: Production in Annex B-R decreases by 2% in 2010 
under the Complete BTA, by 3% in 2010 under the WTO BTA, instead of 7.5% in No BTA. 
It is worth noting that under WTO BTA, total production actually rises a little in non-Annex BR 
countries, which further reduces the rationale for attacking this scenario as distorting 
competition to the detriment of these countries. Indeed, average cement prices in these 
countries tend to decrease under the higher pressure of the Annex B-R, leading to the increase 
in their consumption. This rise offsets the increase in their net imports. 
4.5. BTA: efficient reduction of the carbon leakage 
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Figure 14: CO2 emission in 2010 compared to BaU 
Under Complete BTA, Annex B-R emissions decrease by around 13% in 2010 compared to 
BaU, less than under No BTA. In the same time, non-Annex B-R emissions also decrease, 
because of a little decrease in their production, although very slightly. The spillover rate 
(abatement in non-Annex B-R / abatement in Annex B-R) is 6%. Finally, world emissions 
decrease by 2%, a little more than under No BTA. 
Under the WTO BTA, Annex B-R emissions decrease compared to BaU, a little more than 
under Complete BTA, whereas emissions from non-Annex B-R increase a little. The slight 
spillover observed in the Complete BTA is replaced by a slight leakage: around 4% in 2010. 
The reduction in world emissions is a little lower than under the Complete BTA. 
5. Conclusions 
Some of the messages delivered by our model are straightforward, for example the fact that a 
CO2 tax or auctioned allowances without revenue recycling at a price of 15€ per tonne of 
CO2 in the Annex B-R cement industry leads to a significant carbon leakage (+20%) through 
the international trade channel, despite the importance the transportation costs of this product 
and the capacity shortages. Even though this result does not justify the withdrawal of nonglobal 
climate policies (Baron, forthcoming) since about 80% of the abatement in Annex B-R 
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remains, this indicates that these policies should take seriously into consideration the risks of 
leakage and that the tools able to tackle this issue should be further studied. 
Other insights are related to the comparison between the border-tax adjustments systems 
tested. The Complete BTA system prevents efficiently carbon leakage and even leads to a 
slight positive spillover for Annex B-R countries. However, it could lead to WTO conflicts 
since it can be accused to be unduly protectionist. The WTO BTA system, which is designed 
to be WTO-compatible, avoids such a risk. It constitutes a less efficient hedging against 
carbon leakage but realizes a very acceptable environmental achievement: +4% instead of 
20% without BTA. This moderate environmental loss suggests that this system should be 
accepted because the environmental efficiency of the Complete BTA may be proved to be 
illusory for political reasons. Note that, in both cases, the impact of the BTA systems on 
cement prices above the carbon constrained scenario without BTA is significant: about +5%; 
this is the price to pay by cement consumers to secure a higher environmental efficiency of 
the climate policy and to protect employment. 
Beyond the comparison of these two types of BTA, we hopefully demonstrated that our 
approach help disentangling the mechanisms at stake in carbon leakage, which are merged 
with other issues in the Armington specification, namely the transportation costs, the capacity 
shortages and the investment dynamics to expand capacities. One robust conclusion is that 
under the previous carbon constrained scenario, even without BTA, there is no incentive to 
create to a large extent, in unconstrained countries, new capacities especially devoted to 
export. Indeed, the rise in production costs of constrained countries is not high enough to 
outweigh not only the transportation costs but also the investment costs. Therefore, exports 
keep on coming from capacities built for domestic consumption which are not fully used. 
But all the analyses above have been conducted assuming a scenario in which international 
transport remains non-affected by the carbon constraint. Obviously such a constraint, rising 
costs of transportation, would shelter constrained countries from international competition 
without taking the form of an explicit tool like BTA. Our next step will be then to scrutinize at 
what level such a carbon price on international transport would start to offset the impact of an 
asymmetric constraint. 
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